21 As to the second matter, it is quite clear that there are three categories of decisions that can be made in a case where issues are dealt with in stages: (a) a final decision; (b) an interlocutory decision; and (c) an interlocutory decision with special consequences. It is also clear that whilst the general rule is that interlocutory orders can be challenged after final judgment, there are exceptions. Thus the plurality in Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd  HCA 22; 209 CLR 478, 483  said that the maxim that interlocutory orders can be challenged after final judgment is too wide and the true rule is that this only applies to an interlocutory order which affects the final result. I do not really consider that takes us very far in this case.
28 The test as to whether a judgment is final or interlocutory is not in contest. I have been cited the well known High Court decisionBienstein v Bienstein  HCA 7; 195 ALR 225 at 230 . The test there is “does the decision finally determine the rights of the parties”. Walton says that when Justice Einstein adopted the referee’s report the principal issue was finally determined. Illawarra says this could not be so, the referee was not sent the whole of the case but only seven issues. Certain vital issues were reserved to the Court itself, the Court needed to deal with those non-technical issues after the technical matters were considered. Alternatively, Walton says, that the order made by Justice Einstein is properly to be taken as a declaration of right. All such declarations are to be considered as final orders.
29 Mr Gracie refers to the Privy Council’s decision in Becker v Marion City Corporation  AC 271 and a statement by Nettle JA in the Victorian Court of Appeal in Major Engineering Pty Ltd v Timelink Pacific Pty Ltd  VSCA 228 at  that a declaration of right is always final. There is no quarrelling with that proposition. The problem is for Walton that the declaration was not a declaration covering the entire cause of action, it was merely a declaration of a matter that occurred along the way to reaching the final situation. So whether one can properly construe Justice Einstein’s decision as a declaration or not really does not affect the issue.
42. As noted in the authorities collected as note s 66.45 in Ritchie’s Uniform Civil Procedure NSW , particularly Maxwell v Keun  1 KB 645 and Bloch v Bloch  HCA 56; 180 CLR 390, 395, whilst it is seldom that an appellate court will feel justified in reviewing a decision to refuse an adjournment, the Court has power to review such an order and in certain circumstances it is its duty to do so. It will be its duty to do so if the order made below will defeat the rights of the parties altogether or even where, at least without fault, a vital witness ceases to become available such as happened in Petrovic v Taara Formwork (Canberra) Pty Ltd (1982) 62 FLR 451, 461 (Full Federal Court). It is of little value to multiply examples.
43. As the Full Federal Court said in Petrovic at 460, it is not sufficient that the Court of Appeal considers that an adjournment should have been granted, the applicant must show that refusal of the adjournment produced, in the circumstances, an injustice. It must be remembered too, that the decision is a discretionary judgment.
44. “Injustice” is a coloured word with pejorative overtones. What is meant is that the refusal of the adjournment must not set up a situation where there is a likelihood that there cannot be a fair trial unless that factor is outweighed by prejudice to the opposing party.
 At least in the present case, where the answer to the separate question that has been given does not determine the entire action, the answer to the question is an interlocutory decision, and so an appeal against it can be brought only by leave of this court: s 127(2)(a) District Court Act; Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd at 359–60 ; Inasmuch Community Inc v Bright  NSWCA 99 ; (2006) 45 MVR 234 at , cf Damjanovic at .